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Abstract 
Purpose. Lie detection in insurance claim settings is difficult as liars can easily 
incorporate deceptive statements within descriptions of otherwise truthful 
events. We examined whether the Verifiability Approach could be used 
effectively in insurance settings. According to the Verifiability Approach, liars 
avoid disclosing details that they think can be easily checked, whereas truth 
tellers are forthcoming with verifiable details.  
Method. The study experimentally manipulated notifying claimants about the 
interviewer’s intention to check their statements for verifiable details (the 
‘Information Protocol’). It was hypothesised that such an instruction would (i) 
encourage truth tellers to provide more verifiable details than liars and to report 
identifiable witnesses who had witnessed the event within their statements, and 
(ii) would enhance the diagnostic accuracy of the Verifiability Approach. 
Participants reported 40 genuine and 40 fabricated insurance claim statements, 
in which half the liars and truth tellers were notified about the interviewer’s 
intention to check their statements for verifiable details.  
Results. Both hypotheses were supported. In terms of accuracy, notifying 
claimants about the interviewers intention to check their statements for 
verifiable details increased accuracy rates from around chance level to around 
80%.  
Conclusion. The VA, including the information protocol, can be used in 
insurance settings.   
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Applying the Verifiability Approach to insurance claims settings: 
Exploring the effect of the information protocol  
 
Accurately discriminating between deceptive and genuine statements is 
difficult but advantageous in a variety of domains, including within insurance 
claims contexts. The scientific examination of deception detection in insurance 
claims is in its infancy and much of the forensic lie detection literature has 
focused upon police-suspect interview contexts (Vrij & Granhag, 2012, 2014; 
Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). This is unfortunate given that the loss to the UK 
economy, due to insurance-claims fraud, is estimated at £2.1 billion per annum 
(Association of British Insurers [ABI], 2012) and that, when questioned, 20% of 
insurance holders claimed they would consider making an exaggerated or 
completely false insurance claim in the future (ABI, 2009). The purpose of the 
current study is to examine a new approach to lie detection, the Verifiability 
Approach ([VA], Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014a, b), in an 
insurance claims setting. Specifically, we tested the assumption that the 
information protocol (i.e., informing claimants that the verifiability of their 
statements would be checked and used as the basis of credibility assessments; 
see Nahari et al., 2014b) moderates the utility of the VA in insurance claims 
settings. 
The verifiability approach 
 The VA (Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari et al., 2014a, b) is predicated on two 
core assumptions regarding the interviewees’ mental strategies. First, liars 
believe that ‘richness of detail’ is often used to render credibility assessments. 
This is supported by empirical findings; detailed accounts are more likely to be 
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believed (Bell & Loftus, 1988). Thus, to convey an honest impression, liars are 
motivated to provide a richly detailed report (liars reported such a strategy in 
Nahari, Vrij and Fisher, 2012). Second, unlike truth tellers who can freely report 
verifiable details, liars prefer to avoid including too many details out of fear that 
investigators will check such information and discover their deceit (Masip & 
Herrero, 2013; Nahari et al., 2012). This puts liars in an information 
management dilemma. On the one hand, they are motivated to provide lots of 
details to maximise the chance of being believed.  On the other hand, they are 
motivated to withhold details to minimise the chance of being caught. A potential 
solution for the liar is to strategically withhold verifiable details and be 
forthcoming with details that cannot be verified. By calibrating their respective 
verbal strategies in this manner, it is predicted that liars and truth tellers will 
differ with respect to their information management strategies (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Doering, 2010); that is, truth 
tellers will be more forthcoming with verifiable details than liars. Research from 
police-suspect interviewing contexts has provided support for this assumption; 
liars disclose fewer potentially verifiable details in their statements than truth 
tellers (Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari et al., 2014a, b).  
Applying the verifiability approach to the insurance claims context 
 Generalising from one domain of lie detection (i.e., police-suspect 
settings) to another (i.e., insurance claims settings) is potentially hazardous. 
Insurance settings differ in one fundamental aspect from police settings. Due to 
the obvious asymmetry of information between the insurer and the claimant, the 
insurance investigators do not know when the reported incident (e.g., loss, theft 
or damage) occurred (Nahari, Leal, Vrij, Warmelink & Vernham, 2014).  This is 
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unlike police-suspect interviewing when the investigators often know when the 
crime occurred (e.g., the timing of a robbery or assault). Thus, in police settings 
the emphasis is upon suspects to demonstrate that they were at a location other 
than the crime scene when the transgression took place. Liars making use of an 
embedding strategy in a police-suspect context (e.g., claiming to be at a birthday 
party at the time the robbery occurred) risk contradicting outright known facts. 
Conversely, the asymmetry in insurance settings allows a liar to choose a truthful 
event from memory and to embed a lie about the insurance incident into this 
event. Basing deception upon truthful previous experiences is a preferred 
strategy amongst liars and is referred to as embedded lies (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 
2012; Vrij, 2008).  
Research has shown that telling embedded lies reduces the utility of well-
established verbal veracity tools that assess overall vividness of details, such as 
Reality Monitoring (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher 2012). This is not surprising as a 
central assumption of Reality Monitoring – that a fabricated report originates 
from internal processes (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Vrij, 2008) – is violated in cases 
where an embedded lie is told (i.e., when real memories are drawn upon; Leins 
et al., 2012). In insurance settings, the claimant can fraudulently claim that 
she/he lost his/her phone at a birthday party that she/he had actually attended 
(Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015). In this case, a vividly detailed 
and verifiable account of the birthday party does not say anything about the 
truthfulness of the insurance claim. Thus, the ability to embed ones deception 
allows a claimant to temporally displace verifiable details and may reduce the 
ability of the VA to discriminate between truths and lies (Nahari, Leal et al., 
2014).  
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In the first application of the VA to the insurance claims domain it was 
found that verifiable details did not discriminate between liars and truth tellers 
(Nahari, Leal et al., 2014). The authors reasoned that liars used embedding 
strategies, which allowed them to report sufficient checkable detail to appear 
credible due to the context in which the lie is told (see Nahari & Vrij, 2015).  
Recently, Vrij, Nahari, and Isitt (2015) replicated Nahari, Leal et al.’s (2014) 
insurance based experiment, but employed the ‘information protocol’ (Nahari, 
Vrij & Fisher, 2014) from police-suspect research. Specifically, Vrij et al. (2015) 
instructed all claimants before their interview that the verifiability of their 
statements details would be checked and used as the basis of credibility 
assessments. Interestingly, Vrij et al. (2015) found that truth tellers included 
more verifiable details in their reports than liars.  
To explain the discrepancy between their findings and the null findings 
reported by Nahari, Leal et al. (2014), Vrij et al. (2015) suggested that the 
information protocol manipulation moderates the effectiveness of the lie-
detection tool by eliciting more additional verifiable details from truth tellers 
than liars. Without informing claimants about the interviewers intention to 
analyse the statements for checkable detail, truth tellers may disclose little 
verifiable information (e.g., Nahari, Leal et al., 2014). If so, liars and truth tellers 
differ little in terms of the verifiability of their statements. However, if truth 
tellers are informed that reporting checkable detail is important via the 
information protocol, they are encouraged to report such verifiable information. 
Critically, even if liars are similarly informed, it remains problematic for them to 
be forthcoming with large quantities of such detail because checkable detail can 
potentially threaten their credibility (Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). This is 
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especially true regarding the core events surrounding actual loss where 
potential witnesses can clearly jeopardise the liar’s credibility (Nahari, Leal et al., 
2014). As a result, informing claimants of the intention of the interviewer to 
analyse verifiable details should result in different verbal behaviours from liars 
and truth tellers. Although this explains the discrepancy of previous results 
concerning the VA in insurance claims contexts, Vrij et al. (2015) did not 
manipulate the information protocol. Therefore its effect on the number 
verifiable details amongst liars and truth tellers was not empirically tested in the 
insurance context. The current study examines this experimental manipulation.  
 Based upon previous findings, we expect an interaction between the 
information protocol and veracity regarding the reporting of verifiable detail. 
Specifically, we predict that when the information protocol is withheld from 
participants, liars and truth tellers will not differ in the number of verifiable 
details they report (as observed in Nahari, Leal et al., 2014). However, when 
interviewees are provided with the information protocol, truth tellers will report 
more verifiable details than liars (as observed in Vrij et al., 2015) (Hypothesis 1).  
As such, it is predicted that when the information protocol is provided, the VA 
will be able to discriminate between more true and false statements than when it 
is withheld (Hypothesis 2). 
Finally, according to the VA, truth tellers can be expected to include 
witnesses who can be identified in their claims to a greater extent than liars 
(Nahari, Leal et al., 2014). Because the information protocol primes suspects to 
include any available checkable details (including witnesses who can be 
identified), we predict that informed truth tellers will mention witnesses who 
can be identified more than informed liars, whereas uninformed liars and 
RUNNING HEAD: VERIFIABILITY IN INSURANCE SETTINGS 
 
8 
uninformed truth tellers will report similar numbers of un-witnessed incidents 
(Hypothesis 3).   
Method  
Participants  
A total of 86 participants from the University’s undergraduate, 
postgraduate and staff communities were recruited for the study, six of which 
were discarded prior to analysisi, leaving a total of 80 participants (58 females 
and 22 males) aged between 18 and 40 years (M=21.36, SD=4.13 years).  
Procedure  
 Participants were recruited via adverts on the University’s online 
participant pool. Individuals arrived at the laboratory at pre-arranged times and 
were informed that the study was about detecting deception within insurance 
claim settings. Each participant was given an information sheet about the study 
and where asked to give informed consent.   
 In order to allocate participants to the truthful or deceptive condition, 
each participant was asked the following; ‘Has any item of yours, worth between 
£100 and £1000, been lost or stolen in the last three years?’ Participants who 
answered ‘yes’ were allocated to the truth teller condition, while participants 
who answered ‘no’ were allocated to the lie condition. Data collection continued 
until 40 participants who had genuinely experienced a loss (i.e., truth tellers) had 
been recruited. This resulted in 46 participants who reported they had not 
experienced a genuine loss. All 46 of these participants were assigned to the liar 
condition and were interviewed, but all the data pertaining to the final six 
participants was discarded and not analysed. No difference in age t(78)=.24, p = 
.809, or gender, 2(1, n = 80) = 2.25, phi = 0.168, p = 0.133, emerged between 
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truth tellers  and liars. Participants were then randomly allocated into either the 
informed (provided the information protocol) or uninformed (protocol 
withheld) conditions.   
 Uninformed Truth Tellers (N= 20) were asked to imagine that they were 
submitting a claim about their lost/stolen item to an insurance company. They 
were asked to type a statement about the real incident of loss/theft in as much 
detail as possible. Participants were informed that they needed to convince the 
insurance investigator that they were being honest.  
 Informed Truth Tellers (N= 20) were additionally warned that the 
investigator would read their statement carefully and would check if the details 
provided could be verified “We know from research that liars prefer to avoid 
providing details that can be verified whereas truth tellers prefer to provide 
details that can be verified. Therefore the interviewer will check carefully to 
what extent the details you provide can be verified”.  Specifically, it was 
explained that verifiable details were activities that were (i) documented and 
therefore checkable (e.g., phone calls, cash withdrawal from ATM machines etc.,), 
or when the interviewee said that the activities were (ii) carried out with 
(an)other identifiable person(s) who can be traced (e.g., in contrast to a 
stranger), (iii) witnessed by at least one other identifiable and traceable person 
or (iv) recorded by CCTV cameras (Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). Details that do 
not meet at least one of these criteria are classified as unverifiable (Nahari, Leal 
et al., 2014). Interviewees were also informed that the interviewer may check 
the occurrence of some or all of the details provided in the statements. 
 Uninformed Liars (N= 20) were asked to imagine that they were 
submitting a claim about their lost/stolen item to an insurance company. They 
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were asked to type a statement about a fabricated incident of loss/theft in as 
much detail as possible. Participants were informed that they needed to convince 
the insurance investigator that they were being honest. 
  Informed Liars (N= 20) were provided the same additional information as 
informed truth tellers.  
The participants wrote statements which were subsequently classified 
into three types of events: (i) losses in a public place, (33 truth-tellers and 31 
liars), (ii) losses due to being broken into (six truth-tellers and seven liars), and 
(iii) losses due to assault (one truth-teller and two liars). Fisher’s Exact Test 
revealed no statistical differences between truth-tellers and liars in the type of 
event they discussed, 2(2, n = 80) = 1.344, phi = 0.126, p = .527.   
After typing their statements the participants completed a post-interview 
questionnaire. This assessed participant’s (i) honesty during the interview (as a 
manipulation check); (ii) belief that verifiable detail would be used to base 
credibility assessments (a manipulation check); (iii) motivation during the 
interview to be convincing; (iv) perceived level of success in convincing the 
interviewer of their honesty; (v) perceived difficulty in providing verifiable 
details; and (vi) prevalence of bluffing (i.e., providing false verifiable details) as a 
strategy amongst participants.  
 
Coding the witnessing status of the incident  
 Following Nahari, Leal et al. (2014), each statement was coded 
dichotomously, with respect to if an identifiable other person had witnessed the 
event or not (witnessed versus un-witnessed). A statement was judged un-
witnessed if the loss occurred when the claimant was (i) alone or (ii) if the 
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claimant failed to inform an identifiable other of the loss during, or subsequent 
to, the event. Statements were judged witnessed if (i) identified others were 
present and witnessed the event, or (ii) if the claimant informed an identifiable 
other of the loss during or after the event (e.g., called the police). One coder 
scored all the statements whilst a second coder scored a random 20% of the 
statements for witnessing status. Both coders where blind to the veracity of the 
statements. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was 
performed to determine consistency among raters. Agreement between the 
coders was good, Kappa = 0.75 (p= 0.002, 95% [CI 0.412, 1.000]).  
Coding the verifiability of statements 
 All statements were rated by one coder (blind to the experimental 
conditions) who scored the occurrence of perceptual detail (information about 
what was seen, heard, felt and smelt during the described activities), spatial 
detail (information about locations or the arrangement of persons and/or 
objects) and temporal details (information about when the event happened and 
explicit descriptions of the sequence of various events) that potentially could or 
could not be verified. The coders did not distinguish between these three 
categories of detail because no hypotheses about these three subcategories were 
formulated. Verifiable details were activities that were (i) documented and 
therefore checkable (e.g., phone calls, cash withdrawal from ATM machines etc.,), 
or when the interviewee said that the activities were (ii) carried out with 
(an)other identifiable person(s) who can be traced, (iii) witnessed by at least one 
other identifiable and traceable person or (iv) recorded by CCTV cameras 
(Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). Details that do not meet at least one of these 
criteria are classified as unverifiable (Nahari, Leal et al., 2014). Importantly, the 
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definitions for verifiable and unverifiable details that were used for coding were 
identical to those given to the informed participants. A second coder also marked 
a second, random sample (20%) of the statements for details that could or could 
not be verified. 
Inter-rater reliabilities between the two coders for the occurrence 
frequency of detail that could or could not be verified were measured via intra-
class correlation coefficients (ICC). The ICC for the coders was excellent for both 
verifiable detail (ICC= .97) and unverifiable detail (ICC= .90). The ICC for the 
coders for total detail (the sum of verifiable and unverifiable detail) was also 
excellent (ICC = .93).  
Additionally, we calculated the percentage verifiable detail (total 
verifiable detail/total detail) per statement. The percentage of verifiable detail 
per statement could range from 0 to 1 with a score of .50 indicating the same 
number of verifiable and unverifiable details in a statement. A score above .50 
indicates the participant reported more verifiable than unverifiable details 
whereas a score below .50 indicates the participant reported less verifiable 
detail than unverifiable detail in their statement.  
Results 
Manipulation checks 
Veracity manipulation check. 
 Truthful claimants overwhelmingly reported being more honest (they 
reported that 99.25% of their statement was truthful, SD = 2.66%, 95% CI 
[98.29%, 100.00%]) than deceptive claimants (they reported that 25.75% of 
their statements was truthful, SD = 32.80%, 95% CI [16.34%, 35.59%]), t(78) = 
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14.12, Cohen’s d= 3.15, p = 0.001. This supports the validity of the veracity 
manipulation.   
Information manipulation check. 
 Informed participants (63.00% on a 0-100% scale (SD = 29.71%, 95% CI 
[53.95%, 72.36%]) where 0% indicated ‘not at all likely’ and 100% ‘extremely 
likely’) thought the interviewer would utilise the verifiability of their statements 
to base their credibility assessments to a greater extent that uninformed 
claimants (42.75%, SD= 32.26%, 95% CI [31.91%, 52.36%]), t(78) =2.92, 
Cohen’s d = 0.56, p = 0.005. This supports the validity of the information 
manipulation.  
Motivation, difficulty in reporting verifiable details, bluffing as a strategy 
and number of words 
Motivation. 
 Truth tellers (84.00% on a 0 - 100% scale (SD = 21.81%, 95% CI [76.67%, 
90.24%]) where 0% indicated ‘not at all motivated’ and 100% ‘extremely 
motivated’) and liars (80.00% on a 100% scale, SD = 13.77, 95% CI [75.71, 
84.19]) reported being highly motivated during the experiment and to an equal 
extent, t(78) = .98, p = 0.138.  
Difficulty in Reporting Verifiable Details.  
 Deceptive claimants overall reported finding it more difficult to provide 
verifiable detail (48.75% on a 0-100% scale, (SD = 28.57%, 95% CI [39.75%, 
57.80%]) where 0% indicated ‘not at all difficult’ and 100% ‘extremely difficult’) 
than truthful claimants (33.50% on a 0 - 100% scale, SD = 30.26%, 95% CI 
[23.66%, 42.27%]), t(78) = 2.43, Cohen’s d = .55, p = 0.017.  
Bluffing with verifiable details as a strategy. 
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 More deceptive claimants (26 of 40 liars, 65%) reported bluffing (i.e., 
providing false verifiable details) during their interview than honest claimants (3 
of 40 truth tellers, 7.5%), 2(1, n = 80) = 28.64, phi = 0.59, p = 0.001.  
Number of words. 
On average the claimants wrote 174.54 words (SD = 75.98, 95% CI 
[158.04, 190.49]). A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Information) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
showed a main effect for Veracity, F (1, 76) = 4.56, MSE = 5057.56, partial eta2 = 
.05, p = 0.047, with truthful claimants (M= 191.53, SD= 89.51, 95% CI [163.96, 
217.64]) providing longer statements that deceptive claimants (M= 157.55, SD= 
55.59, 95% CI [139.32, 174.87]). Additionally, a main effect for Information was 
found, F (1, 76) = 8.50, MSE = 5057.56, partial eta2 = .10, p = 0.006, with informed 
claimants (M= 197.73, SD= 78.65, 95% CI [173.91, 221.15]) providing longer 
statements than uninformed claimants (M= 151.35, SD= 66.37, 95% CI [132.43, 
172.47]). The Veracity X Information manipulation was not significant, F (1,76) = 
1.11, MSE = 5057.56, partial eta2 = .01, p = 0.362. 
Hypothesis testing  
We examined the claimant’s reports for both absolute number of 
verifiable details and the relative percentage of each statement’s detail that was 
verifiable (i.e. verifiable detail/ total detail).   
Number of verifiable details. 
A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Information) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
number of verifiable details as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
main effect for Veracity, F (1, 76) = 11.94, MSE = 50.21, partial eta2 = .14, p = 
0.001, showing that truth tellers (M = 14.15, SD = 9.37, 95% CI [11.33, 17.22]) 
reported more verifiable details than liars (M = 8.68, SD = 5.61, 95% CI [7.07, 
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10.56]). There was also a statistically significant main effect for Information, F (1, 
76) = 12.606, MSE = 50.21, partial eta2 = .14, p = 0.001, showing that informed 
claimants (M = 14.23, SD = 9.10, 95% CI [11.70, 17.30]) reported more verifiable 
details than uninformed claimants (M = 8.60, SD = 6.13, 95% CI [6.82, 10.50]).  
The Veracity X Information interaction effect was statistically significant, 
F (1, 76) = 5.67, MSE = 50.21, partial eta2 = .07, p = 0.020. Informed truth tellers 
(M = 18.85, SD = 9.37, 95% CI [14.93, 22.81]) reported significantly more 
verifiable details than informed liars (M = 9.60, SD = 6.09, 95% CI [6.94, 12.42]), 
t(38)=3.70, Cohen’s d = 1.17, p = 0.010. In contrast, there was no significant 
difference between uninformed truth tellers (M = 9.45, SD = 7.07, 95% [6.50, 
12.62]) and uninformed liars (M = 7.75, SD = 5.07, 95% CI [5.67, 10.07]), 
t(38)=.87, p = 0.388. These findings support Hypothesis 1.  
We tested the utility of the information manipulation to elicit a higher 
number of verifiable details as a diagnostic cue to deception.  We ran two 
discriminant analyses to distinguish between (i) informed claimants and (ii) 
uninformed claimants. In each case, the objective group belonging (truthful 
versus deceptive) was the classifying variable and verifiable detail was the 
predictor. As Table 1 shows a significant discriminant function emerged for 
distinguishing between informed truth tellers and liars, 2(1) = 11.53, Wilk’s 
Lambda = 0.74, p = 0.001 (canonical correlation was .51). The function correctly 
classified 65.0% of truth tellers and 90% of liars resulting in a total accuracy rate 
of 77.5%. The discriminant function for uninformed claimants was not 
significant, 2(1) = 0.75, p = 0.388. These results support Hypothesis 2.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Percentage of verifiable details. 
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A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Information) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
percentage of verifiable details as the dependent variable revealed a significant 
main effect for Veracity, F(1,76)=5.62, MSE=2.75, partial eta2 =.07, p = 0.020 
showing that truth tellers (M=.46, SD=.23, 95% CI [.38, .52]) reported a higher 
percentage of verifiable details in their statement than liars (M=.36, SD=.17, 95% 
CI [.30, .41]). The analysis also revealed a significant main effect for Information, 
F(1,76)=7.88, MSE= 2.75, partial eta2 =.09, p = 0.006, showing that informed 
participants (M=.47, SD=.03, 95% CI [.29, .43]) reported a higher percentage of 
verifiable details in their statements than uninformed participants (M=.35, 
SD=.30, 95% CI [.26, .44]).  Furthermore, the Veracity x Information interaction 
was significant F(1, 76)=7.23, MSE=2.75, partial eta2 = .09, p = 0.009. Informed 
truth tellers (M =.57, SD = .18, 95% CI [.49, .64,]) reported a significantly higher 
percentage of verifiable detail per statement than informed liars (M = .36, SD = 
.16, 95% CI [.29,.43]), t(38)=3.88, Cohen’s d = 1.26, p=0.001. However, no 
statistically significant difference was found for the percentage of verifiable 
detail reported by uninformed truth tellers (M = .34, SD = .21, 95% [.25, .43]) and 
by uninformed liars (M = .35, SD = .20, 95% CI [.26, .44]), t(38)=.87, p = 0.836. 
Collectively, these findings support Hypothesis 1. 
We also ran two discriminate analyses to distinguish between (i) 
informed claimants and (ii) uninformed claimants. In each case, the objective 
group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was the classifying variable and the 
percentage of verifiable detail (verifiable/total detail per statement) was the 
predictor. As Table 1 shows a significant discriminate function emerged for 
distinguishing between informed truth tellers and informed liars, 2(1) = 12.56, 
Wilk’s Lambda = 0.71, p = 0.001 (canonical correlation was .53). The function 
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correctly classified 80.0% of the informed truth tellers and 80.0% of the 
informed liars resulting in an overall total accuracy rate of 80.0% of the 
informed claimants.  The discriminate function for uninformed claimants was 
not significant, 2(1) = 0.43, p = 0.84. These results support Hypothesis 2.  
Finally, we used a simple decision rule to classify truth tellers and liars 
(unlike discriminant analyses, it is easier for investigators to apply simple 
decision in real life). When the rule ‘those who include more verifiable than 
unverifiable detail in their statements are truth tellers’ was applied, 80% (16 of 
20) of informed truth tellers and 90% (18 of 20) of informed liars (85% overall 
accuracy) were correctly classified. In contrast, when the same decision rule was 
applied to uninformed claimants, 40% (8 of 20) of uninformed truth tellers and 
70% (14 of 20) of uninformed liars (55% overall accuracy) were correctly 
classified. These results support Hypothesis 2.  
Witnessing the incident. 
 A series of chi-square analyses were conducted to explore the 
dependence between veracity (truth teller or liar) and witnessing of the incident 
(witnessed or un-witnessed). Overall, liars (20 of 40, 50.0%) and truth tellers 
(13 of 40, 32.5%) did not report a significant difference in the number of un-
witnessed incidents, 2(1, n = 80) = 2.527, phi = 0.17, p = 0.086.  When we 
distinguished between informed and uninformed participants (relevant for 
Hypothesis 3), a different pattern emerged. Uninformed liars (11 of 20, 55%) 
and uninformed truth tellers (10 of 20, 50%) did not report a significant 
difference in the number of un-witnessed incidents, 2(1, n = 40) = 0.10, phi = 
0.05, p = 0.752. In contrast, informed liars (9 of 22, 45%) reported significantly 
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more un-witnessed incidents than informed truth tellers (3 of 20, 15%), 2(1, n = 
40) = 4.386, phi = 0.32, p = 0.038. This supports Hypothesis 3.  
Discussion 
The current study showed that notifying claimants about the 
interviewer’s intention to check their statements for verifiable details moderates 
the utility of the VA (Nahari et al., 2014a, b, c) in insurance claims settings. As 
such, the findings offer an explanation for the discrepancy between the results of 
previous research regarding the VA’s utility in insurance claims settings (Nahari, 
Leal et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 2015). Within insurance claim based studies, where 
no information protocol is administered, liars and truth tellers do not appear to 
differ with regard to the verifiability of their statements (Nahari, et al., 2014). In 
the current study, when claimants were not provided with the information 
protocol, uninformed truth tellers and liars reported similar levels of verifiable 
detail. Conversely, in previous insurance claim based studies, where the 
information protocol is provided (Vrij et al., 2015), truth tellers report more 
verifiable details than liars, thus facilitating lie detection with the VA. 
Analogously, in the current study, when claimants were provided with the 
information protocol, truth tellers provided more verifiable details in their 
claims than informed liars. In terms of diagnosticity of the VA, uninformed 
claimants in the current study could not be accurately classified by the 
discriminant function when using either the number of verifiable details or 
percentage of verifiable detail as the predictor. In contrast, informed claimants 
could be classified at a higher level of accuracy when using the number of 
verifiable details (overall accuracy of 77.5%) and the percentage of verifiable 
detail (overall accuracy of 80%). Thus, the information protocol facilitated 
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increased lie detection accuracy in the current study. The current results 
reinforce the conclusion that the information protocol moderates the diagnostic 
utility of the VA within insurance claims settings. These results clearly contrast 
with those that utilise the VA within police-suspect interviews whereby the 
information protocol enhances the utility of the VA (Nahari et al., 2014b); 
however, is not necessary to elicit diagnostic verbal cues (Nahari et al., 2014a). 
Hence, the current study indicates that the effectiveness of lie detection tools 
generally, and the VA specifically (e.g. Nahari, Leal et al., 2014; Jupe, Vrij & 
Nahari, 2015), cannot be generalised without empirical testing for the specific 
forensic domain being considered (e.g., police-suspect, portal crossing, 
intelligence gathering or insurance claims contexts) (Vrij & Granhag, 2012, 2014; 
Vrij et al., 2010).   
The present study’s accuracy rates are encouraging when one considers 
the length of the claimant’s statements. Overall in this study – and in line with 
previous research (Leal et al., 2015, experiment 2) – claimants provided short 
statements (M = 174.54 words; SD = 75.98, 95% CI [158.04, 190.49]). This is 
generally problematic for lie detection tools that analyse verbal content because 
there is little opportunity for differences between liars and truth tellers to 
emerge (Leal et al., 2015; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). However, when 
claimants were provided with the information protocol, clear verbal content 
differences emerged. Collectively, these results support previous research 
findings; that the VA is not detrimentally affected by interviewees knowing about 
it’s function. Rather, such information actually enhances its utility (Nahari, et al., 
2014b).  
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Unsurprisingly, liars indicated finding it more difficult to report verifiable 
details than truth tellers. Liars, if embedding their lie within real memories, are 
unable to provide verifiable detail that threatens their credibility if investigated 
(Nahari et al., 2014a, b). However, deceptive claimants (26 of 40 liars, 65%) also 
reported bluffing (e.g., providing false verifiable details) more during their 
interview than honest claimants (3 of 40 truth tellers, 7.5%). We do not think 
this bluffing strategy used by liars is overly problematic for two reasons. First, 
the number of liars prepared to bluff in an experiment is almost certainly higher 
than in real life, as liars are less likely to believe that the truthfulness of their 
statements will be investigated. Second, as our findings show, even with 
prevalent bluffing liars still reported fewer verifiable details and lower 
percentages of verifiable detail per statement than truth tellers.  Thus, the 
problem for informed liars appears to be a matter of calibration because they 
cannot report the quantity of checkable details that informed truth tellers can.   
 The results of the current study are encouraging given that lie detection 
within the insurance claim domain is particularly problematic. First, the 
insurance claims settings is difficult because it provides an opportunity for 
claimants to provide embedded deception (Leal et al., 2015; Leins et al., 2013), a 
strategy that generally reduces the diagnostic accuracy of verbal veracity 
assessment tools (Nahari et al., 2012). Given that liars reported that 
approximately 25% of their claims were being drawn from a truthful experience, 
it is evident that liars in the current study used such embedded tactics. Previous 
research has shown that, in comparison with outright lies, embedded lies are 
more difficult to detect by verbal lie-detection tools (Nahari et al., 2012). Again, 
this makes the current detection rates impressive.  
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 The percentage of verifiable detail (verifiable detail/total detail) can be 
used as a within-subjects decision rule to facilitate lie detection. Within-subjects 
lie detection tools are preferred by practitioners as they allow for control of the 
considerable number of individual differences within verbal and non-verbal 
responses (Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & Granhag, 2012).  When the rule 
‘those who include more verifiable than unverifiable detail in their statements 
are truth tellers’ was applied, 80% (16 of 20) of informed truth tellers and 90% 
(18 of 20) of informed liars (85% overall accuracy) were correctly classified. 
These percentages are especially promising because this rule is easy to apply. 
When the same decision rule was applied to uninformed claimants, 40% (8 of 
20) of uninformed truth tellers and 70% (14 of 20) of uninformed liars (55% 
overall accuracy) were correctly classified. These findings reinforce the 
conclusion that the information protocol moderates the utility of the VA in 
insurance claims contexts.  
 The current findings converge with two broader theoretical perspectives 
in the lie detection literature. First, the lack of diagnostic cues in the uninformed 
condition supports the finding that without active elicitation, cues to deception 
are typically weak and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003; Colwell et al., 2013; Vrij 
& Granhag, 2012; Levine, 2014). Second, the fact that verifiable detail displayed 
diagnostic utility in the informed condition supports the corollary of this first 
assumption, namely, that cues to veracity can be elicited and enhanced via 
strategic, cognitively-based interviewing (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2006, 2008; 
Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal 2011).  
In conclusion, providing insurance claimants with information about the 
VA facilitated improved lie detection accuracy. Therefore the VA was shown to 
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be generally robust against countermeasures. Coupled with previous results that 
showed that the information manipulation enhanced the utility of the approach 
in police-suspect interviews (Nahari et al., 2014b), it can be recommended that 
the information protocol be integrated within the full VA.  
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i For practical reasons we continued data collection until 40 participants 
reported having had an item of theirs, worth between £100 and £1000, being 
lost or stolen in the last three years. The six participants excluded from analysis 
were the last participants recruited prior to the truthful conditions being filled. 
For ethical reasons, the additional participants were run and entered into the 
prize draw. However, due to an a priori decision to have 20 per cell as a stopping 
rule, their data was not transcribed, coded or analysed.  
Table 1. Hit Rates for verifiable detail and the percentage of verifiable detail 
per statement (verifiable/ total detail) as a function of information. 
 Informed claimants  Uninformed claimants 
 Truthful 
(%) 
Deceptive 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
 Truthful 
(%) 
Deceptive 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Verifiable detail  
Accuracy rate 
 
65.0 
 
90.0 
 
77.5 
  
50.0 
 
65.0 
 
57.5 
Verifiable/ total 
detail 
Accuracy rate 
 
80.0 
 
80.0 
 
80.0 
  
50.0 
 
45.0 
 
47.5 
 
Note. Accuracy rates from significant discriminate functions appear in bold.   
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